At the Munich Conference that led to the Munich Agreement in September 1938, Hitler Neville Chamberlain said that if UK policy were to “make it clear in certain circumstances” that the UK could intervene in a European war on the European continent, the political conditions for the agreement were no longer met and Germany should denounce it. As a result, Chamberlain introduced it in the Anglo-German declaration of 30 September 1938. [60] The Helgoland-Zansibar Treaty (German: Helgoland-Zanibar Treaty, also known as the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890) was an agreement signed on 1 July 1890 between the German Empire and Great Britain. The misleading name of the contract was introduced by former Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who was preparing to attack his despised successor, Caprivi, to conclude an agreement reached by Bismarck himself during his management. However, Bismarck`s nomenclature implied that Germany had traded an African empire for a small Helgoland (pants for button). [4] This was taken with zeal by imperialists who complained of “treason” against German interests. Carl Peters and Alfred Hugenberg advocated the creation of the All-German Association, which took place in 1891. [5] Due to the length of time required to build warships and the short duration of the agreement, its effects were limited. German and British naval experts estimated that the earliest year germany reached the 35% limit was 1942.

[47] In practice, the lack of shipbuilding, design problems, a shortage of skilled labour and a shortage of foreign exchange to buy the necessary raw materials slowed the reconstruction of the German navy. A shortage of steel and non-ferrous metals, due to the fact that the navy was in third place in terms of German rearmament priorities, meant that the navy (as the German navy had been renamed in 1935) was still far from the 35% limit when Hitler denounced the agreement in 1939. [48] In December 1934, a secret ministerial committee met to discuss the situation through German rearmament. Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, told a meeting of the committee that “if the alternative to legalising German rearmament is to prevent it, there would be everything to say not to legalise it.” [30] However, since London had already rejected the idea of a war to end German rearmament, the British government chose a diplomatic strategy to replace Part V in exchange for Germany`s return to the League of Nations and the World Conference on Disarmament. [30] At the same meeting, Simon said: “Germany would, it seems, prefer to be an honest woman; but if it stays too long to engage in illegitimate practices and find from experience that it does not suffer from it, this laudable ambition can wear out. [31] In January 1935, Simon wrote to Georg V.: “The practical choice is between a Germany that continues to arm itself without any regulation or agreement, and a Germany that enters the community of nations through the recognition of its rights and certain changes in peace treaties and contributes in this way or another to European stability.”

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