In applying this test, His Honour considered that the five-year period for the trade restriction clause in this case was appropriate for the following reasons: a contractual obligation not to act is null and void and unenforceable with respect to the promisor, since it is contrary to public policy for the promotion of trade, unless the restriction of trade is appropriate: to protect the interests of the buyer of a business.  Trade restrictions may also appear in restrictive agreements in employment contracts after termination. Its judge of honour, Davies, found that there had been a prima facie breach of the trade restriction clause in respect of the defendants who were in competition with the first applicant, while the currency of the trade restriction clause.2 Davies J then considered whether the five-year trade restriction clause was appropriate. One of the principles is that a gentleman does not have the right to prevent his employee from offering competition after the termination of his employment relationship, but that he is entitled to adequate protection against the exploitation of trade secrets. In Mason v. Provident Clothing Co, the House of Lords did not allow an employer to restrict its advertiser for a period of three years after leaving service. Viscount HALDANE LC indicated that the ability to advertise is a natural gift and is not due to specific training from the employer. If they had merely asked him not to attach himself to paintings in the field in which he had actually contributed to the construction of the goodwill of their enterprise or in a field limited to places where the knowledge he had acquired in his employment could clearly have been used to their detriment, they would have obtained the right to detain him within those borders. On the other hand, to Fitch v. Dewes, the House of Lords allowed an alliance by which a lawyer was recycled by practice within 7 miles of the city, which was reasonably necessary to protect the interests of both parties. But under no circumstances would the court allow covenants against competitions. A Attwood v. Lamont, the employer, ran several departments related to sewing, etc.
And the employee was just the superintendent of sewing. The deal with him was that after he stopped being an employee, he wouldn`t commit in 10 miles to one of the employer-run businesses in addition to sewing. The Court of Appeal found that the agreement was not only abnormally broad, but also competitive. . . .